The Nomination of Justice Brennan: Eisenhower\u27s Mistake? a Look at the Historical Record by Wermiel, Stephan J.




The Nomination of Justice Brennan: Eisenhower's
Mistake? a Look at the Historical Record
Stephan J. Wermiel
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wermiel, Stephan J., "The Nomination of Justice Brennan: Eisenhower's Mistake? a Look at the Historical Record" (1995).
Constitutional Commentary. 1012.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1012
THE NOMINATION OF JUSTICE BRENNAN: 
EISENHOWER'S MISTAKE? A LOOK AT 
THE HISTORICAL RECORD 
Stephen J. Wermiel* 
The nomination of William J. Brennan, Jr. in 1956 to be an 
associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court occupies that famil-
iar place in modem American legal history that is at once both a 
tangible event and a subject of considerable mythology and 
speculation. 
The mythology centers on several issues about the selection 
of Justice Brennan, including how he came to the attention of the 
White House, whether his mentor-the eminent legal scholar 
Arthur Vanderbilt-supported the choice, and whether the ap-
pointment was a mistake for President Eisenhower. 
This article seeks to demystify the appointment of Justice 
Brennan by describing his selection and examining the widely 
circulated myths. Research for this work is based on numerous 
interviews with major participants in Justice Brennan's selection, 
including Justice Brennan himself, and on an extensive documen-
tary record that has not previously been examined in full by 
researchers. 
After describing the selection and appointment of Justice 
Brennan, this paper concludes that, while complaints expressed 
by President Eisenhower about Brennan in the years after his 
appointment may have reflected genuine frustration with Bren-
nan's liberal bent, this dissatisfaction was not reflective of the 
factors that influenced Eisenhower when he selected Brennan. 
In marked contrast to the focus of the current nomination pro-
cess on judicial philosophy and changing Supreme Court out-
comes, little attention was paid to the substance of Brennan's 
legal views at the time of his nomination. Brennan fulfilled the 
• Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Copy-
right ~ 1994 by Stephen J. Wermiel. The author is at work on a biography of Justice 
Brennan to be published by Lisa Drew Books/Scribner, and for which he has had the 
cooperation of Justice Brennan, his family, and his law clerks. This article was originally 
presented as a paper at the American Society for Legal History annual meeting in Mem-
phis, Tenn., on Oct. 23, 1993. 
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specific purposes for which he was chosen: he was a Democrat, a 
Catholic, and a state court judge; he was comparatively young for 
a Supreme Court nominee; and he remained committed to re-
form efforts to reduce delays and backlogs in the nation's courts. 
All of these were important qualities for the White House, which 
was then little more than five weeks away from a presidential 
election. 
I 
A brief biographical sketch helps set the stage. Brennan was 
born in Newark in 1906, the son of Irish immigrant parents. His 
father was a laborer who rose in the ranks of the union to be-
come executive of the local. Concern over the union's welfare at 
the hands of local officials and police prompted the elder Bren-
nan to run for the Newark City Commission, the equivalent of 
the city council. A top vote-getter, the elder Brennan served as 
Public Safety Commissioner throughout the 1920's while his son 
attended the Wharton School of Fmance at the University of 
Pennsylvania and then the Harvard Law School. Justice Brennan 
graduated Harvard Law in 1931, a year after his father died. 
Before and after World War II, Brennan's law practice fo-
cused heavily on labor relations. The establishment Newark firm 
in which he practiced, Pitney, Hardin & Ward, later Pitney, Har-
din, Ward & Brennan, represented management, not workers, an 
often uncomfortable position for Brennan. 
After World War II, Brennan became active with a group of 
young lawyers who were pressing for reform of the New Jersey 
judicial system. In 1947, New Jersey adopted a new constitution, 
including restructured courts~ and Brennan agreed to help put 
the new plan into effect. He was appointed to the new superior 
court bench in 1949 by a Republican governor, although Brennan 
was a Democrat. His mentor was Arthur Vanderbilt, the nation-
ally prominent legal figure and New Jersey Supreme Court Chief 
Justice for whom Brennan quickly became a trusted lieutenant 
and for whom Brennan led statewide efforts to eliminate conges-
tion and long delays in the courts. For Brennan, this interest in 
court reform was not simply a matter of efficiency; it was directly 
connected to his view of the need for fairness and compassion in 
the law. Brennan was quickly promoted to the superior court's 
appellate division, and in 1952 to the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
where Vanderbilt was Chief Justice. There, Brennan cemented 
his relationship as Vanderbilt's right-hand man, no small achieve-
ment since Brennan frustrated Vanderbilt by disagreeing with 
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him on a number of important court decisions.! Brennan trav-
eled the state advocating the reforms that he and Vanderbilt fa-
vored, particularly pre-trial conferencing in all cases and docket 
control and calendar management for state court judges, which in 
those days were controversial propositions. 
Brennan's record on the New Jersey Supreme Court bas 
long been the focus of speculation. The popular view is that he 
was a moderate who turned liberal once on the U.S. Supreme 
Court. However, both Brennan's friends in New Jersey at the 
time and other local legal observers knew that he was unmistaka-
bly liberal, and his record of decisions affirms that view.2 
Although the state court had little occasion to deal with fed-
eral constitutional questions, Brennan wrote a few opinions that 
foreshadowed his approach on the U.S. Supreme Court. In In Re 
Pillo,3 he took a broad view of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, finding the privilege in New Jersey to be based on com-
mon law tradition, rather than on the Fifth Amendment. In 
Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan,4 he took a strong position against 
prior restraint of free expression. He also expressed strong sup-
port for the guarantee against double jeopardy in State v. 
Midgeley.s 
In his most famous state court dissent, State v. Tune,6 he ex-
coriated the majority for refusing to allow an accused murderer 
to inspect his own confession. "It shocks my sense of justice that 
in these circumstances counsel for an accused facing a possible 
death sentence should be denied inspection of his confession 
which, were this a civil case, could not be denied," he wrote. 1 To 
Chief Justice Vanderbilt's argument that greater use of discovery 
in criminal cases would lead to increased perjury,s Brennan 
responded: 
1. See the discussion of the cases in text accompanying notes 3-12, infra. 
2. This conclusion is based on the author's interviews with a number of Brennan's 
contemporaries in Red Bank and Rumson, New Jersey at the time. 
There is also contemporaneous documentation. The November 1956 issue of the Pas-
saic County Bar Association newsletter observed, "We have a 'hunch' that Justice Bren-
nan will be heard from more and more in a way to gratify liberal sentiment in the 
country." J.L. Bernstein, The Philosophy of Mr. Justice BreiiiUIII, The Reporter, Novem-
ber, 1956, 1, 3. 
3. 93 A.2d 176 (NJ. 1952). 
4. 96 A.2d 519 (NJ. 1953). 
5. 105 A.2d 844 (NJ. 1954). 
6. 98 A.2d 881 (NJ. 1953). 
7. I d. at 896. 
8. ld. at 893. 
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That old hobgoblin perjury, invariably raised with every sug-
gested change in procedure to make easier the discovery of 
the truth, is again disinterred from the grave where I had 
thought it was forever buried under the overwhelming weight 
of the complete rebuttal supplied by our experience in civil 
causes where liberal discovery has been allowed.9 
An academic commentator at the time noted the strength of 
Brennan's dissent and agreed that discovery should be available 
in criminal cases. "To employ the tool in civil cases, and to rely 
upon adversary proceedings in murder cases, when the defend-
ant's life may be at stake, is an anachronism," Rutgers Professor 
Robert E. Knowlton wrote.to When the case returned to the 
New Jersey Supreme Court one year later for a second deci-
sion,u yielding the same result, another commentator observed 
"that Brennan, J.'s forceful dissent in the first hearing in the Tune 
matter is still a burr under the saddle in which the majority of the 
court rides. "t2 
II 
It is impossible to identify the precise moment at which 
Brennan first became the focus of the Supreme Court nomina-
tion process. There are no records available to pinpoint the pro-
cess with that degree of precision.13 Most participants agree, 
however, that the story really began in May 1956, more than four 
months before Brennan was chosen.l4 
On May 21 and May 22, 1956, the Justice Department con-
vened the Attorney General's Conference on Court Congestion 
and Delay in Litigation. The unprecedented gathering of more 
than 80 judges, bar association presidents, and other lawyers 
took place in the Great Hall of the Justice Department. William 
P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General at the time to Attorney 
General Herbert Brownell, was the impresario of the conference. 
9. Id. at 894. 
10. Robert E. Knowlton, Criminal Low and Prodedure, 8 Rutgers L. Rev. 78, 79 
(1953). (Knowlton was then an assistant professor of law at Rutgers University School of 
Law.) Id. at 78. 
11. State v. Tune, 110 A.2d 99 (NJ. 1954). 
12. Lewis l)'ree, Evidence, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 324, 326 (1955). 
13. John V. Lindsay, who was an aide to Attorney General Brownell at the time, 
confirms that Brownell often did not keep written records of events and meetings. 
14. There was general agreement between former Attorney General Herbert 
Brownell and former Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers, in separate inter-
views, on this account. In addition, it retlects the way Justice Brennan has always under-
stood the sequence of events. 
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Brennan, then an associate New Jersey justice, delivered one 
of the major addresses of the two-day meeting on May 22, outlin-
ing New Jersey's experience with court reform. Brennan also 
served as moderator for the entire morning's discussion of the 
court reform experiences in New Jersey, Maryland, New York 
and elsewhere.ts 
One story that has circulated widelyt6 is that Brennan was 
called by Vanderbilt at the last minute and asked to substitute for 
him, and that Brennan read from Vanderbilt's notes. His 
Supreme Court nomination, this story continues, was a mistake 
because it was based on an impression created by Brennan's re-
marks, which were really Vanderbilt's. This story is significant 
because it was largely the favorable impression created by Bren-
nan at the conference, as well as his possession of the correct 
demographic qualities, that led to his selection. If the story is 
correct, then Brennan's selection would literally have been a 
mistake. 
There is substantial evidence to contradict, although perhaps 
not to entirely put to rest, this myth that Brennan simply read 
Vanderbilt's notes, although the factual record makes for a less 
interesting story. First, Brennan's own office files contain a copy 
of a speech that is marked, "Address By Honorable William J. 
Brennan Jr., Prepared for Delivery before the National Confer-
ence on Congestion in the Courts."t7 In the upper left corner of 
the title page, the document admonishes, "For Release At 10:00 
A.M. EDT, Tuesday, May 22, 1956." The FBI's background in-
vestigation of Brennan in 1956 also observes that the Bureau's 
files include a copy of this speech, prepared for delivery.ts Lest it 
appear that the obvious conclusion has been omitted, this text 
matches verbatim the printed transcript of what Brennan said at 
the conference, except for an ad-libbed introduction.19 
Underlying the story that Brennan only read Vanderbilt's 
notes is a broader misconception, the assumption that he would 
15. The full text of the sessions was published as Proceedings of Attorney General's 
Conference on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation (1956) ("Proceedings"). 
16. For one version of this story, see Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr.: Policy-Making in the Judicial Thicket in Charles M. Lamb, et al., eds., The 
Burger Court: Political and Judicial Profiles 100, 102 (U. Ill. Press, 1991) ("In part, the 
nomination may have resulted from Eisenhower's misplaced reliance on the contents of a 
'conservative' speech that Brennan had not written but had merely agreed to deliver for 
an ailing Vanderbilt.") 
17. A copy of this speech is on file with the author. 
18. The notation is included in FBI files obtained through a Freedom of Information 
Act [FOIA] request, on file with the author. 
19. Proceedings at 78-88 (cited in note 15). 
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not have been able to give his own address because Vanderbilt 
was the reformer and Brennan just a functionary. This is a mis-
conception. Throughout his four-year tenure on the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, Brennan often gave speeches on state court re-
form efforts, and the speech at the Attorney General's confer-
ence draws on his earlier efforts. He traveled the state, 
advocating, explaining, and implementing pre-trial conferencing 
rules that he helped write. But his reputation in the technical 
world of court reform also extended beyond the borders of New 
Jersey. Brennan's office files include major addresses on court 
reform to the North Carolina Bar Association on June 25, 1954, 
the American Bar Association annual convention in Philadelphia 
on Aug. 23, 1955, and the Suffolk Law School Alumni Associa-
tion in Boston on Oct. 21, 1955.20 Although by no means ana-
tionally prominent figure, he had a reputation in his own right in 
judicial reform circles and it is both demeaning and misleading to 
suggest that he needed Vanderbilt's notes. 
A less substantive, more procedural interpretation of the 
myth is possible: that Brennan drew on Vanderbilt's notes be-
cause he did not have time to prepare his own material. How-
ever, this, too, is a matter of some doubt. Brennan remembers 
that he was asked to fill in for Vanderbilt. He has no recollec-
tion, however, of how short the notice was, and he is adamant 
that he received no notes from Vanderbilt. Records show that 
Brennan had, at an absolute minimum, at least three days to pre-
pare. According to the transcript of his remarks at the confer-
ence, he did not attend the first day, Monday, May 21, and only 
arrived in Washington late Monday night. A story in the Newark 
Evening News of Saturday, May 19, announced that Brennan 
would be one of two New Jerseyans at the conference.21 So, 
Brennan had at least May 19, May 20, and part of May 21 to 
prepare for remarks that were similar to those he had delivered 
in the past. Brennan describes his preparations: "I prefer for 
something like this, to talk from a speech. So I wrote mine out, 
down at the Congressional Hotel, as it then was. "22 
20. Copies of these speeches are on file with the author. The ABA address is pub-
lished. William J. Brennan, Remarks on Pre-Trial, 17 F.R.D. 437, 479 (1955). He also 
delivered a similar address soon after the Attorney General's conference, appearing on 
June 7, 1956, before the Kansas City Bar Association. 
21. Court Jams Under Study, Newark Evening News, May 19, 1956, page number 
omitted, copy of article located in papers of Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Wesleyan University 
Archives. 
22. Author's tape-recorded interview with Justice Brennan #5 of 66, October 28, 
1986, transcript p. 21. 
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The final evidence against the myth is that after he con-
cluded his prepared remarks and other panelists had finished 
speaking, Brennan made additional impromptu remarks that oc-
cupy three full pages of transcript.23 
It is far from clear why Vanderbilt did not attend. The only 
reference in the 137 -page transcript is a remark by a member of 
Brennan's panel, Judge Fred Brune of the Maryland Supreme 
Court, who said of Vanderbilt, "It is very regrettable that he can 
not be here today because, I believe, his court is in session, but 
I'm very glad they could spare Justice Brennan. . . "24 The most 
common explanation for Vanderbilt's absence is that he had suf-
fered a stroke, but his stroke was some years earlier and the only 
record of any illness at the time of the conference is that he had 
slowed down and cut back on speaking and appearances because 
of the continued effects. Robert Seaver, then Assistant Deputy 
Attorney General and later clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court, did 
much of the staff work for the conference, and does not recall 
ever having Vanderbilt actually scheduled to participate. "In try-
ing to get hold of Vanderbilt, I learned from his office that he was 
in no shape to do it and that Brennan had taken the mantle," 
Seaver said. "We didn't even really talk to Vanderbilt about par-
ticipating," recalled Seaver. "He was too ill."25 Rogers, who as 
deputy attorney general took principal responsibility for the con-
ference, has no recollection of Vanderbilt being invited and then 
canceling.26 He does remember Vanderbilt recommending Bren-
nan highly to participate in the conference.27 
III 
By nearly all accounts, it was Brennan's performance at the 
conference, and Eisenhower's interest in demographics, that put 
the spotlight on Brennan a few months later. Justice Sherman 
Minton, a Democrat from Indiana, announced on September 7, 
1956, that he planned to retire on October 15th. The daily office 
diary kept by Eisenhower's secretary, Ann Whitman, noted that 
Minton's announcement was on the wire service ticker before Ei-
23. Proceedings at 110 (cited in note 15). 
24. Proceedings at 95 (cited in note 15). 
25. The author's interview with Robert Seaver was conducted by telephone on July 
13, 1990. 
26. Rogers gave this account in an interview with the author on September 1, 1987, 
in Washington, D.C. This account was reconfirmed in a telephone interview at Rogers' 
Washington office on May 12, 1994. 
27. ld. 
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senhower actually got the letter and that the staff, at least, was 
irked by this abrupt announcement.28 
Within minutes, President Eisenhower called Attorney Gen-
eral Brownell, who was in New York, and told him of the im-
pending Supreme Court vacancy. Ann Whitman was on the 
extension phone taking notes,29 and summarized the 
conversation: 
President suggests the Attorney General start thinking again 
about a very good Catholic, even a conservative Democrat-
thinks we really would be better off to appoint a Democrat to 
show that we mean our declaration that the Court should be 
non-partisan (in spite of the fact that the ratio now is Demo-
crat 6, Republican 3). Some discussion of Judge Daniher 
[sic).30 Brownell said he was a good practicing Catholic. But 
the President asked the Attorney General to canvas the field, 
to try to find outstanding man, with Court experience, regard-
less of his political affiliation.31 
Later in the day, Republican chairman Leonard Hall called 
and Ann Whitman reported: 
Chmn. Hall called. 
He just heard of Justice Minton's letter of retirement. Makes 
room for Catholic. 
President said he called Brownell about it this noon. Thought 
of a good conservative Democrat, particularly if he had been 
on the Bench for some time-politics would be of no moment. 
Hall said if the area could be Midwest, would be wonderful. 
President said only one he knows with qualifications is 
Daniher of Connecticut.32 
The first steps that led to the selection of Brennan actually 
preceded Minton's retirement by some weeks. According to 
Bernard Shanley, a New Jersey lawyer who was then an aide to 
Eisenhower, Francis Cardinal Spellman, the Archbishop of New 
28. The diary entry is in the files of the Eisenhower Library. 
29. One Eisenhower biographer, William B. Ewald, Jr. has chronicled how Eisen-
hower's secretary often took notes on an extension phone and even how Eisenhower 
occasionally used a hidden tape recorder. William B. Ewald, Jr., Eisenhower The Presi-
dent: Crucial Days, 1951-1960 87 (Prentice-Hall, 1981). 
30. Judge John A. Danaher of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit was 57 years old at the time of Minton's retirement and had served on the 
appeals court for three years. He was not a Democrat; indeed, he was active in Republi-
can circles and served one term as a U.S. senator from Connecticut from 1939 to 1945. 
31. Ann Whitman's phone call summaries were obtained from the Eisenhower 
Library. 
32. Ann Whitman's summary of phone call from Leonard Hall. Obtained from Ei-
senhower Library. 
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York, had visited Eisenhower earlier in 1956 and asked that a 
Catholic be named to the next vacancy ,33 since no Catholic had 
sat on the Court since Frank Murphy died in 1949.34 Shanley 
said that Eisenhower turned to him during the meeting with 
Spellman and told him, "I want you to let me know when there is 
an opening-remind me of what the Cardinal has just said."3s 
In the days after Minton's announcement, President Eisen-
hower mentioned the process of filling the vacancy at several 
news conferences, but he gave few clues. Brennan's name was 
not among those on which speculation focused in the news me-
dia; those included Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, former 
New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey, and Attorney General 
Brownell.36 Also mentioned was a suggestion for the first black 
Supreme Court Justice: Judge William H. Denman, chief judge of 
the Ninth Circuit, wrote to Eisenhower to urge him to appoint 
Judge William H. Hastie of the Third Circuit.37 Finally, the Presi-
dent publicly ruled out due to age Judge John J. Parker, chief 
judge of the Fourth Circuit, whose nomination to the high court 
was rejected by the Senate in 193Q.3s 
No one is quite sure when Brennan's name first surfaced. 
William P. Rogers, then deputy attorney general, believes that he 
suggested Brennan to Attorney General Brownell.39 Brownell is 
not sure where the name first surfaced.40 It was readily apparent 
to both men, however, that Brennan fit a number of the demo-
graphic qualifications in which Eisenhower was interested. 
He was a Catholic, and would enable Eisenhower to fulfill 
his promise to Cardinal Spellman. Indeed, they later had Shan-
ley check with Brennan's parish priest to see if he regularly at-
tended Mass, and Shanley reported him to be a good Catholic.4t 
Shanley and Brennan had known each other since their 
school days in Newark, and it has been widely assumed that 
Shanley pushed Brennan's nomination. Shanley denied playing 
33. Author's tape-recorded interview with Shanley, June 11, 1987, Morristown, N.J. 
34. The replacement of Justice Murphy in 1949 with Justice Tom C. Clark, a Protes-
tant, marked the first time since 1894 that there was no Catholic Justice on the Supreme 
Court. Congressional Quanerly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court 788 (1979). 
35. Interview with Shanley (cited in note 33) .. 
36. Dewey Mentioned For Supreme Coun, N.Y. Times, September 9, 1956, at 56. 
37. Negro Urged For High Coun, N.Y. Times, September 12, 1956, at 33. 
38. President Keeps Coun Post Open, N.Y. Times, September 12, 1956, at 23. 
39. Notes of author's interview with Rogers, September 1, 1987, Washington, D.C. 
40. Transcript of author's tape-recorded interview with Brownell, February 10, 1988, 
New York. 
41. Shanley said this caused him some difficulty with Cardinal Spellman, who com-
plained to him soon after the announcement that he did not consider Brennan to be a 
proper, practicing Catholic. Shanley trancript (cited in note 33). 
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any significant part, however, and said his only role was to check 
on Brennan's status in the church. Brennan had another old 
friend in Washington, Labor Secretary James Mitchell, a fellow 
New Jerseyan. Curiously, there is no record of Mitchell or Shan-
ley playing much of a role in Brennan's behalf. 
Brennan-50 at the time-was also young enough to satisfy 
Eisenhower's desire to appoint Justices who were younger than 
age 62.42 He also had court experience, another Eisenhower re-
quirement.43 Brennan also came from a well-regarded state 
court, an important factor because Eisenhower was under pres-
sure from the Conference of Chief Justices to foster greater con-
sideration of state court authority and jurisdiction on the part of 
the Supreme Court and the federal government. 44 Finally, Bren-
nan was a Democrat, another factor Eisenhower had said he was 
seeking in his first conversation with Brownell about the 
vacancy.4s 
Two questions are most compelling about Brennan's nomi-
nation: Why were these factors so important to Eisenhower? 
And what was Arthur Vanderbilt's role? 
However, a few more details are necessary to round out the 
picture before turning to these essential matters. Although there 
is little record of how it developed, Brennan's nomination 
emerged and moved along quickly. Some time during the last 
two weeks of September, Brownell said he read all of Brennan's 
New Jersey court opinions; there are more than 400. Said 
Brownell: 
So I read all his opinions on the New Jersey Court and he 
seemed to have, to be qualified. His experience had been 
somewhat limited in that he specialized in the labor field. 
There were no opinions of his that really grappled with the 
constitutional problems that the Supreme Court constantly 
faces but we felt that with, there's no doubt about his charac-
42. During the search for Minton's successor, Eisenhower referred at a news confer-
ence to the requirement of "a reasonable age." President Keeps Courr Post Open (cited in 
note 38). 
Almost six months later, Eisenhower prepared a statement for Ann Whitman's daily 
diary of February 5, 1957, discussing Supreme Court qualifications and noting that their 
nominees had been "under 62 years of age." Memorandum obtained from Eisenhower 
Library. 
43. This quality is also mentioned in the Ann Whitman diary entry of February 5, 
1957. 
44. Brownell recalled, "There were a couple of political pressures. One was the chief 
justices of the state courts had petitioned the President to see to it that more consid~ra­
tion was given by the Supreme Court to the problems of the state courts and the relation-
ships between the state courts and federal courts." Brownell interview (cited in note 40). 
45. See text accompanying note 31, supra. 
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ter, and his legal and judicial experience were not only ade-
quate but really outstanding.46 
525 
If this is an accurate description of the process, then Brownell 
either missed, missed the significance of, or was not upset by the 
handful of visible, liberal decisions or dissents that Brennan 
crafted on the New Jersey Supreme Court. It would not be diffi-
cult at all to miss a handful of highlights in quickly reviewing 
hundreds of pages of dry, largely state-law rulings. According to 
commentators at the time, Brennan was not one of the leading 
dissenters either in number of votes or in number of opinions, 
making it even more possible that a handful of dissenting opin-
ions could be overlooked.47 It is also possible that Brownell was 
not reading the opinions for their merits as much as he was for 
their craftsmanship and overall competence. 
Brownell maintains that he read the opinions, knew what 
was in them, and made no mistake. "The fact that he was a rug-
ged individualist and had his own opinions didn't bother me," 
said Brownell. "There were some criminal opinions, but they 
didn't bother me."48 
The first record of Brennan as the focal point of the nomina-
tion process comes from the FBI. On Thesday, September 25, 
1956, the FBI Newark field office cabled the headquarters in 
Washington a five-page doubled-spaced memo that was re-
quested on Monday, September 24, the day before.49 The cable 
was a background check on Brennan, finding that all of those 
interviewed held him in the highest regard. The memo was anx-
iously awaited, because a second, typed version of it bears the 
notation that it was delivered by an FBI supervisor to Attorney 
General Brownell's home at 9:35p.m. on Thesday night. Rogers 
received his copy at the office at 9:45 a.m. on Wednesday, Sep-
tember 26. 
At about this time, there was another investigation under-
way. Rogers called Bernard Segal, Philadelphia lawyer and 
chairman of the American Bar Association Standing Committee 
46. Transcript of Brownell interview (cited in note 40). 
47. David Stoffer, The Work of the Judicio/ System: 1954-55, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 381, 
393 (1955). Stoffer says Brennan cast only ten dissenting votes in the 1954-1955 term of 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, compared with more than twenty for three other col-
leagues and more than thirty for one Justice. His dissenting opinions numbered only five, 
making him the third-ranked in volume, well-behind the leading dissenter who had 
twelve. 
48. Brownell's comments, confirming his earlier statements, see note 40 supra, were 
made in a telephone interview on March 29, 1994. 
49. The memo was obtained through an FOIA request, but the names of those inter-
viewed by the FBI field agents in New Jersey remain blacked out. 
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on the Federal Judiciary. The ABA had checked some of Eisen-
hower's lower court nominations, but had not previously been 
asked to review a Supreme Court nomination. Rogers asked Se-
gal to conduct a confidential evaluation of Brennan and to report 
back as soon as possible. 
By September 27, the decision was all but final, and Eisen-
hower gave a subtle hint at a news conference. He responded to 
a reporter's question by saying, "[W]hen you come to the 
Supreme Court, my people look up the record of every sitting 
judge that they can find, district courts and circuit courts in the 
Federal and all of the supreme court justices in the states. "so 
On Friday, September 28, Brownell, Eisenhower and presi-
dential adviser Sherman Adams met in the Oval Office at 3:00 
p.m.s1 There is no record of the conversation, but it seems likely 
that they decided to go ahead and bring Brennan down to meet 
the President. At about 5:30 p.m., Brennan and his law clerk, 
Clyde Szuch, were working unpacking law books in brand new 
chambers that had been designed just for Brennan and to which 
they had just moved in Red Bank, New Jersey, overlooking the 
Shrewsbury River. The telephone rang, Brennan recalled, and it 
was Brownell, asking him to come see the President on Saturday 
moming.sz Brennan assumed that Brownell wanted him to join 
the Attorney General's task force on reducing congestion and 
delays, and he resisted, telling Brownell, "You know how I feel 
about that." But he said that Brownell told him that if the Presi-
dent wanted to see him, he could not refuse. 
Brennan was driven to Newark, some 50 miles away, to 
board a train in the middle of the night. It most likely was the 
Midnight Keystone, leaving Newark after midnight and arriving 
at Union Station after 5 a.m. Brennan remembered arriving 
about 5:30 a.m. on Saturday, September 29 and was shocked to 
find Brownell waiting to meet him. They drove to Brownell's 
house in northwest Washington for breakfast, and along the way, 
Brennan recalled, Brownell asked if he knew why he was there. 
Brennan said he knew and he wanted no part of the task force. 
Brownell interrupted and told him it was for the Supreme Court 
vacancy and that they were going to meet Eisenhower. Brennan 
50. The Transcript of Eisenhower's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Af-
fairs, N.Y. limes, September 28, 1956, at 14. 
51. Sherman Adams appointment books, Sept. 28,1956. Listing for 3 p.m. says, "The 
President, Att. Gen. Brownell." Sherman Adams papers, Dartmouth Library. 
52. Unless otherwise indicated, this account and the details that follow come from 
transcript of author's interview with Justice Brennan, IS, October 28, 1986. 
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was flabbergasted. "To this day," Brennan said, "I know we had 
breakfast, but I can't remember it." 
They went to the White House, where they were met by 
Sherman Adams and were ushered into the Oval Office. Bren-
nan recalled that Brownell and Adams left and he spent a few 
minutes alone with Eisenhower. He said Eisenhower told him he 
would have liked to have appointed Arthur Vanderbilt to the 
Supreme Court, but that Brennan's mentor was too old and too 
weak at that point. The President, Brennan recalled, said they 
would wait until Monday to announce the appointment because 
New Jersey's two senators, Clifford Case and Alexander Smith, 
had not even been consulted yet. The meeting ended, Brennan 
having accepted the job. President Eisenhower's calendar for the 
day shows that the meeting, including the initial introductions by 
Adams and Brownell, lasted from 9:17 a.m. to 9:37 a.m., 20 min-
utes exactly.53 
Brownell took Brennan back to the Justice Department so 
he could call his mother and his wife and tell them the news, but 
to ask them to remain silent about it. While he was making the 
phone calls, he recalls that Brownell came back in and said the 
President wanted to see him again. The two men went back to 
the White House, and Eisenhower said he wanted to announce it 
right away instead of waiting until Monday. The calendar shows 
that Eisenhower met with Brennan, Brownell and presidential 
news secretary James Hagerty from 1:03 p.m. to 1:12 p.m. The 
announcement was made and pictures were taken. Brennan an-
swered one or two questions, responding that he did not vote in 
the 1952 presidential election because he did not satisfy the resi-
dency requirement in Rumson, where he had just moved his fam-
ily, and declined to say who he would vote for in the imminent 
1956 election.54 
Why the sudden rush? No one knows for sure. Eisenhower 
told him that he was afraid it would leak out, Brennan recalled. 
Another reason may be that a missing piece of the puzzle arrived 
between the two sessions at the White House: the ABA report. 
Segal telephoned his report to Rogers at about 11 a.m. on Sep-
tember 29,55 and that left only the notification of the two sena-
tors outstanding. 
53. The President's Appointments, Saturday, September 29, I956, obtained from Ei-
senhower Library. 
54. Jersey Judge Is Named To U.S. Supreme Coun, Sunday Bulletin, September 30, 
1956, 1, 2. 
55. Choice Of Brennan Hinged On Investigation By Segal, Sunday Bulletin, Septem-
ber 30, 1956, 2. 
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Brownell and Brennan went up to the Supreme Court, 
where they met Chief Justice Earl Warren and went out with him 
for lunch, and then Brennan boarded the Congressional at Union 
Station at about 3 p.m. for the train ride to Newark, where he 
arrived at about 7:30 p.m. and was met by his two sons and a host 
of newspaper reporters and photographers. In his haste all after-
noon, he had neglected to call his mother and his wife back to tell 
them that the news was public, and when he did finally reach 
them, they were already overrun with reporters. 
Since the nomination was a recess appointment, Brennan 
was sworn in and took his place on the Supreme Court bench on 
October 16, 1956. His confirmation hearings were not held until 
some months later in February, 1957.56 
IV 
One of the interesting questions about the nomination is the 
role played by Arthur Vanderbilt, who was a giant in the law and 
Brennan's mentor. One popular myth recounts how Vanderbilt 
privately was distraught at Eisenhower's selection of Brennan 
and was overheard to comment, "He has done it again."s7 It is 
always difficult to prove a negative-that something did not hap-
pen. However, the verbal and documentary record is filled with 
evidence to the contrary and strongly suggests that Brennan had 
Vanderbilt's support. 
Theories abound that Vanderbilt had been considered for, or 
even promised a seat on the Supreme Court by Eisenhower 
before Earl Warren was named Chief Justice in 1953. According 
to these stories, Vanderbilt wanted to be Chief Justice but would 
not consider a position as an Associate Justice, and declined to 
be in the running for the seat that went to John Harlan in 1954, 
or Brennan in 1956. His preference not to be considered in 1954 
or 1956 is documented in one biography.ss The fact that Eisen-
hower considered him as a possible Chief Justice when he chose 
Warren is also documented in some accounts.s9 
It seems highly unlikely that Eisenhower would have ac-
tively considered Vanderbilt in 1956. Born on July 7, 1888, he 
was 68 years old by the time Minton retired. It is still possible, 
56. Nomination of William Joseph Brennan Jr.: Hearings Before the Committee on 
the Judiciary, United States Senate, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). 
57. For a version of this story, see Kim Isaac Eisler, A Justice For All: William J. 
Brennan, Jr. and the Decisions that Transformed America 92 (Simon & Schuster, 1993). 
58. Arthur T. Vanderbilt II, Changing Law: A Biography of Arthur T. Vanderbilt 
215 (Rutgers U. Press, 1976). 
59. See Ewald, Eisenhower The President at 80 (cited in note 29). 
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nevertheless, that Eisenhower was disappointed when he realized 
in 1956 that he would not have the chance to name Vanderbilt. It 
is equally possible that Vanderbilt recognized in 1956 that he 
would never get the chance to go on the high court. All of this is 
speculative and does not support the undocumented story that 
Vanderbilt was displeased with Brennan's appointment. 
The story of Vanderbilt's alleged disappointment seems to 
carry with it a more substantive quality which bears refuting to 
the extent it is possible. Implicit in the tale, it seems, is the idea 
that Vanderbilt knew that Brennan was too liberal and was not 
an appropriate appointee for Eisenhower's views. This, too, can 
be refuted from documentary evidence available.60 
But what was Vanderbilt's role? In his memoir, Eisenhower 
said that Vanderbilt had written him that Brennan was "the finest 
'judicial mind' that he had known ... "6t No record has been 
found of any such letter from Vanderbilt, either in Eisenhower's 
files at the Eisenhower Library, or in Vanderbilt's collection at 
the Wesleyan University Library. The Eisenhower Library can 
find no supporting evidence for the statement in the working pa-
pers for the memoir. Neither of the two writers who assisted 
with the memoir has any recollection of supporting materials for 
the passage.62 
It seems apparent from the records and memories that do 
exist that Vanderbilt did not call the White House or the Justice 
Department and initiate consideration of Brennan's name. What 
is more likely, and readily supported with documentation, is that 
he strongly recommended Brennan when he was asked about 
him. 
George H. Williams, later director of the American Judica-
ture Society, was an assistant dean of New York University Law 
School when Vanderbilt was dean. When Vanderbilt became 
New Jersey chief justice, Williams stayed on as assistant dean and 
continued to work closely with Vanderbilt who remained deeply 
involved in the law school. Williams remembered being in Van-
derbilt's home study in Essex Fels, New Jersey, when Brownell 
called Vanderbilt three times within an hour to ask questions 
about Brennan.63 Vanderbilt's answers, Williams said, were filled 
with the highest regard and praise for Brennan. That comports 
60. See text accompanying notes 66-70, infra. 
61. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate For Change 1953-1956 230 (Doubleday, 1963). 
62. Letter from President's son, John Eisenhower, May 18, 1993. Telephone conver-
sation with Dr. William Ewald, June 2, 1993. 
63. Notes on interview with the author at American Bar Association meeting in 
Denver, February 4, 1989. 
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with Brownell's memory as well.64 The most plausible explana-
tion for Eisenhower's statement is that Brownell passed on Van-
derbilt's telephone advice, and it stuck in Eisenhower's memory. 
This view, that the White House received positive support for 
Brennan from Vanderbilt, is contemporaneously reenforced by a 
briefing paper for Eisenhower for an early October press confer-
ence in 1956, soon after Brennan was selected. The briefing pa-
per, which summarizes the matters discussed with Eisenhower in 
preparation for the news conference says: 
Justice Brennan. Had followed out what he said was being 
done, this man had an excellent record, Judge Vanderbilt for 
whom the President has the highest opinion and greatest re-
spect, recommended him highly, and he was thoroughly and 
unqualifiedly accepted by the American Bar Association.65 
There is much additional evidence on Vanderbilt's attitude 
about Brennan's selection. The most significant contemporane-
ous evaluation came from Bernard Segal, who checked Brennan 
out for the ABA. His report was telephoned to Rogers on Sep-
tember 29. The written version, stamped "Confidential" and 
dated October 1, 1956, said: 
I spent many hours contacting everyone whose opinion I 
thought might be worth while on the subject. First I reached 
Chief Justice Vanderbilt. He could not have been more enthu-
siastic. He said that he considered Justice Brennan ideally 
suited for the appointment and that his only regret was that 
Justice Brennan's appointment would deprive Chief Justice 
Vanderbilt of the comfort of knowing that upon his resigna-
tion next year as Chief Justice of New Jersey, Justice Brennan 
would be available as his successor.66 
Other documentary evidence exists as well. Vanderbilt 
wrote letters to numerous friends and associates in October 1956, 
all uniformly reflecting his support for Brennan. To Robert S. 
Snively, president of the New Jersey Bar Association, he wrote 
on October 3, 1956, "I am very happy to have had some small 
part in telling the AG just what I think about my colleague."67 
To Frank Morley, a Minneapolis lawyer, Vanderbilt wrote on Oc-
tober 5, 1956, "I regard him as an extraordinarily able judge. The 
64. Herbert Brownell with John P. Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney 
General Herbert Browne/1180 (U. Press of Kan., 1993). 
65. Obtained from Eisenhower Library. 
66. A copy of this report was provided by Mr. Segal during an interview in 
Philadelphia. 
67. Arthur Vanderbilt files, Wesleyan University Library. 
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President did not consult me, but the AG did and I gave my col-
league the highest kind of recommendation."68 To Victor L. But-
terfield, president of Wesleyan, Vanderbilt wrote on Nov. 21, 
1956: 
The first thing that strikes you about Bill Brennan is his youth. 
He is 50 years young. The next thing is his fondness for people 
which is very real. The third thing is his industry and knowl-
edge and wisdom; he is constantly growing and the fact that he 
should have 20 years on the bench is full of meaning. Fmally, 
however, his crowning trait is his courage and forthrightness.69 
Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, is Vanderbilt's own 
continued correspondence with Brennan days after his nomina-
tion was announced. On October 5, 1956, Vanderbilt wrote a 
page-and-a-half single-spaced letter to Brennan, which stated: 
Let me start the morning by telling you ... my sense of per-
sonal gratitude for the active support which you have given me 
in my efforts to build up our judicial establishment from an 
administrative standpoint during your entire period of service 
on the Court. It was truly magnificent and far beyond the call 
of duty; without it I hesitate to think where we might be ... 
While I know that all of your votes on appeals were dictated 
by conscience and intelligence alone, I cannot refrain from at 
least telling you how much the working of your conscience and 
intelligence has meant to me in our years of association.70 
Vanderbilt then suggested that if Brennan ever felt frus-
trated by the Supreme Court, he might return to New Jersey to 
take over the state supreme court. "I think it is no secret that I 
had hoped that you would be the next Chief Justice of New 
Jersey," Vanderbilt wrote in the October 5 letter.n 
There is additional evidence as well, but perhaps the point is 
sufficiently established. Although they had their jurisprudential 
differences and ideological disagreements, the documentary rec-
ord hardly seems to suggest thoughts of one who was angry, up-
set, bitter or disappointed about Brennan's nomination. 
Moreover, this substantial evidence to refute the myth stands in 
68. ld. 
69. ld. 
70. This letter is in a correspondence file in Brennan's office. This correspondence 
will eventually become part of Brennan's papers at the Library of Congress, but is among 
several file cabinets of material that have not yet been turned over to the Manuscript 
Division. 
71. ld. 
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marked contrast to the absence of any direct evidence to support 
it. 
v 
The speculation about Vanderbilt's relationship to Bren-
nan's nomination is in a sense directly related to the protracted 
debate over why Eisenhower chose Brennan and whether he was 
later disappointed by the choice. If there is any truth to the tales 
of disappointment, it may derive from a single motivation: sur-
prise at Brennan's place as a leading liberal member of the War-
ren Court. 
To examine this issue, it is necessary to examine a number of 
different questions: Why did Eisenhower choose Brennan? Did 
Eisenhower actually express his disappointment with Brennan? 
Did the process by which Brennan was selected provide Eisen-
hower with any basis to be disappointed later? 
A 
The first of these questions may be the most difficult to an-
swer. The popular view is that Eisenhower and his aides were 
focused on the 1956 election, then less than six weeks away. The 
President comfortably defeated the Democratic ticket of Adlai 
Stevenson and Estes Kefauver, with a popular vote of 35,585,316 
to 26,031,322 in 1956, a better margin than in 1952. Six weeks 
before the election, however, with the campaign just underway, 
Eisenhower and his staff were concerned about his image-he 
had suffered a heart attack one year earlier in September, 1955, 
and voter perception of his health and vigor was a wild card. At 
the same time, then Senator John F. Kennedy, a young, vigorous 
and attractive politician, was campaigning hard throughout the 
Catholic and Democratic northeast for the Democratic ticket. 
It is difficult to know whether these electoral factors were 
the focus of Eisenhower and his staff. Aides to Eisenhower have 
denied in interviews that Eisenhower would have concerned him-
self with the impact of the nomination on the presidential race. 
"Eisenhower wouldn't do things like that, he was basically anti-
political," said aide Bernard Shanley.n Brownell said the 
demographics had more to do with Eisenhower's belief that "he 
wanted to appoint people to the Supreme Court who would have 
the confidence of not only the legal profession but of the public 
generally ... He thought that one way to do it (was) to see to it 
72. Transcript of Shanley interview with author, June 11, 1987. 
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that the Court was not made up exclusively of either of the major 
parties. "73 
There are occasional glimpses that suggest a contradictory 
view. In the Newark Evening News of Monday, October 1, 1956, 
an unsigned story from the paper's Washington Bureau quoted 
unnamed White House aides on the political motivation of the 
nomination. One White House official, the story said, explained 
that in addition to Brennan's abilities, "he and the others consid-
ered for the post were looked at from the political point of view 
as well."74 The article quoted "another presidential aide," who 
said, " 'We felt that a Catholic of Irish background would be an 
offset to the appeal that young Sen. John Kennedy of Massachu-
setts is making on the Democratic voters who swung to Eisen-
hower four years ago.' "1s The article continued, "Kennedy has 
been campaigning hard for Adlai Stevenson in Eastern areas 
where the so-called Catholic vote is important. White House 
sources said reports have been received at Republican National 
Committee headquarters that Kennedy has great popular appeal 
among Democrats who voted for Eisenhower in 1952 but might 
defect this year."76 
No one seriously argues that the selection of Brennan actu-
ally made a demonstrable difference in the results of the 1956 
election. It may be one of the factors that contributed to a con-
tinued pattern of voting among Catholic Democrats. Eisenhower 
carried New Jersey in both 1952 and 1956. He also carried Cath-
olic strongholds like Rhode Island, Massachusetts and New York 
in 1952 and 1956. It would be silly to suggest that Brennan's 
nomination was the reason, but it is by no means implausible to 
think that Eisenhower's political staff considered the appoint-
ment of a Catholic Democrat a cementing or reenforcing step. 
Recall that one of the first conversations Eisenhower had about 
the vacancy, after Brownell, was with the chairman of the Re-
publican National Committee, Leonard Hall, with whom he dis-
cussed looking for a Catholic and a Democrat.n There can be no 
suggestion that the conversation with Hall took place because 
Hall was a trusted adviser on legal affairs and judicial appoint-
ments, rather than on political matters. 
73. Transcript of author's interview with Brownell, February 10, 1988. 
74. Decision to Name Brennan to Top Court Was Sudden, Newark Evening News, 
October 1, 1956, page number unavilable, copy of article included in Vanderbilt papers at 
Wesleyan University Library. 
75. ld. 
76. ld. 
77. See text accompanying note 32, supra. 
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Although there may have been some electoral motivation 
for the appointment, this does not negate the other distributive 
values and factors outlined by Brownell that worked in Bren-
nan's favor: age and likely length of Supreme Court tenure; a 
Catholic seat; a Democrat, to preserve the nonpartisan nature of 
the Supreme Court;7S and a state court judge, to satisfy the con-
stituency of state chief justices who were virtually at war with the 
federal courts over habeas corpus and other federalism issues. 
The political and distributive attributes of Brennan's nomination, 
taken together, made him a strong candidate indeed. 
B 
The most frequently cited comment about Brennan's nomi-
nation is undoubtedly the observation attributed to Eisenhower 
that "my two worst mistakes are both sitting on the Supreme 
Court." When this quote is used, one searches in vain for any 
citation to when or where Eisenhower is supposed to have said 
this. 
It is probable, if not certain, that Eisenhower never spoke 
these precise words, even in private conversation about Chief 
Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, although they have been at-
tributed to him thousands of times. The Eisenhower Library has 
searched for these words and has never found them. None of the 
individuals interviewed in my research who worked for Eisen-
hower ever heard him say it: not Shanley, Brownell, or Rogers. 
There is no record of the quote in the Sherman Adams papers at 
Dartmouth College. 
One source for the dissemination of the quote may well have 
been the eminent University of Virginia government professor, 
Henry Abraham. His widely-read, multiple-editions book, Jus-
tices and Presidents,79 erroneously appropriated a quotation from 
an Eisenhower biography by Elmo Richardson. Richardson, in 
his 1979 work,so borrowed from an oral history interview by 
Ralph Cake, an Oregon Republican leader.8 t 
78. The balance of the Supreme Court before Minton retired was six Democratic 
Justices (Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, Oark, Reed and Minton) and three Republicans 
(Warren, Harlan and Burton). Eisenhower's two previous appointments, Earl Warren 
and John Harlan, were both Republicans and he later explained that he was looking for 
balance in his own appointments, not just balance on the Court. 
79. Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents: A Political History of Appoinlments 
to the Supreme Court (Oxford U. Press, 3d ed. 1992). 
80. Elmo R. Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Regents Press 
of Kan., 1979). 
81. Ralph Cake, oral history transcript prepared by Columbia University Oral His-
tory Project, OH 111, Part 2, p. 39. Thanscript excerpt obtained from Eisenhower library. 
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Cake, in the interview, described meeting with Eisenhower 
and having the President explain that Warren was appointed 
Chief Justice because he had been promised the spot by an Ei-
senhower aide. Cake recounted that Eisenhower said, " '. . . 
while I had not made the promise, I just felt that I could not tum 
him down. That was the sole reason that appointment was made, 
and it's one of the two biggest mistakes I made in my administra-
tion.'" The Cake transcript continues," 'Well,' I said, 'Mr. Presi-
dent, what was the other big mistake?' He said, 'None of your 
business.' "82 
Richardson's biography repeated Cake's account of Eisen-
hower's comment up to " 'it's one of the two biggest mistakes I 
made in my administration,' " properly attributing the statement 
to Cake's oral history interview.83 Richardson then added, "The 
latter phrase echoed a remark ascribed to several other presi-
dents. Asked if they had made any mistakes during their tenure, 
the joke ran, they had replied: 'Yes, and both of them are sitting 
on the Supreme Court.' "84 
In the 3rd edition of Abraham's book, Justices and Presi-
dents, the author recounts, "When Eisenhower was asked later if 
he had made any mistakes while he had been president, he re-
plied: 'Yes, two, and they are both sitting on the Supreme Court.' 
'Both' referred to Warren and Brennan."8s As authority, Abra-
ham cites, "Quoted by Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 
1979), p. 108."86 Of course, there is no such statement attributed 
to Eisenhower at that spot in Richardson's work or anywhere 
else in the book. Indeed, the story was deleted from a later edi-
tion of Richardson's work and substituted with the observation, 
"Years later Eisenhower considered Warren's appointment 'the 
biggest damfool mistake I ever made . . . ' "87 
None of this is the real point, however. Professor Abraham 
got it right in substance, if not in fact. There are at least three 
independent sources who say they heard Eisenhower express 
thoughts similar to the famous, never-uttered quotation. The di-
ary of Justice Harold Burton reflects that on July 17, 1958, when 
he went to the White House to tell Eisenhower that he planned 
82. ld. 
83. Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower at 108 (cited in note 80). 
84. ld. 
85. Abraham, Justices and Presidents at 266 (cited in note 79). 
86. ld. at 395, note 41. 
87. Chester J. Pach Jr. and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, Revised Edition, 141 (U. Press of Kan., 1991). 
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to retire, the President "expressed disappointment at the trend of 
decisions of Chief justice and Justice Brennan. He asked the 
Atty. Gen. to be most careful in the choice of my successor."ss 
Eminent New York Tunes newspaper columnist Arthur 
Krock heard similar views on April 6, 1960, when he was sum-
moned to the White House for a 90-minute chat with Eisen-
hower. Krock wrote himself a seven-page memorandum 
summarizing the conversation the next aftemoon.s9 His memo-
randum states, "It was clear that the President has been disap-
pointed in the far Leftist trend of Chief Justice Warren, and has 
been equally astounded at the conformity to this of Justice Bren-
nan. He said that Chief Judge Arthur Vanderbilt of New Jersey 
had assured him Brennan had an 'ideal judicial concept', and 
that, when he looked over Brennan before appointing him, the 
Justice's general comments had given him the same impression." 
Yet another source, who made no contemporaneous record 
of the encounter but recalled it years later, was Fred Friendly.90 
He said that he and Walter Cronkite visited Eisenhower to pre-
pare for a series of interviews in May, 1961, when Eisenhower 
had left office and returned to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. 
Friendly said he tried to make lunch conversation by noting that 
Eisenhower's administration would be remembered for putting 
Earl Warren on the Supreme Court. According to Friendly, Ei-
senhower replied, " 'I'm surprised to hear you say that Fred. 
That was the worst mistake I ever made.' " Friendly said he then 
asked, "Are you saying that's one of the mistakes you made as 
President?" Eisenhower, Friendly said, "put 2 fingers up: 'two 
and they're both sitting on the Supreme Court-Earl Warren 
and William Brennan.' He said, 'Brennan's just as bad. Those 
are two very important jobs, and I didn't do a very good job with 
them.'" While the recollection is revealing, neither Friendly nor 
Cronkite thought to ask Eisenhower to repeat the comments af-
. ter lunch when they were taping the interviews. 
VI 
There remains the question of whether Eisenhower's disap-
pointment, however it was expressed, was justified. Because the 
nomination process focused so heavily on the political and demo-
88. Burton's diaries are on microfilm in the Manuscript Division of the Library of 
Congress. 
89. The memorandum is in the Arthur Krock papers at the Seeley Mudd Library at 
Princeton University. 
90. Telephone interview with the author, May 4, 1990. 
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graphic attributes of Justice Brennan, it is difficult to accept Ei-
senhower's disaffection with the liberal direction of his nominee. 
Numerous friends and associates of Brennan in 1950's New 
Jersey recall him as a liberal person who left little doubt about 
his views. Those who followed his legal career knew that he was 
unmistakably a sometime liberal thorn in Vanderbilt's side when 
it came to the merits of New Jersey Supreme Court decisions. It 
is difficult to see how the men around President Eisenhower 
could have missed Brennan's liberalism. Indeed, Brownell pre-
fers to remember that they were aware of Brennan's views and 
were not troubled by them.91 
The explanation is that they were focused, first, on political 
demographics, and then, even as to substance, on court reform 
and judicial administration, more than on substantive constitu-
tional or jurisprudential outcomes. The inescapable conclusion is 
that Eisenhower got precisely the political result for which he 
was searching in the nomination process of William J. Brennan, 
Jr. 
91. See text accompanying note 48 supra. 
